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1
1.1

Introduction
Motivation

Grid-connected devices are increasingly outfitted with internet connectivity for the purpose
of improved management of the United States’ electrical infrastructure. Colloquially known
as the smart grid, the upgrade aims “to increase energy efficiency, reliability, and security; to
transition to renewable sources of energy; to reduce greenhouse gas emissions; and to build a
sustainable economy” [1]. However, these advanced networking capabilities come with costs,
and the cost of network connectivity is exposure to cyberattacks.
Attacks on infrastructure are frequent. For recent examples, see the 2021 closure of the
Colonial Pipeline by ransomware attackers [2], the 2015 cyberattack on Ukraine’s power grid
which triggered a blackout [3], or the attempt to poison the water supply of Oldsmar, FL
[4]. The attack in [2] halted the flow of refined gasoline and triggered a wave of panic buying
until the flow was restored. The attack in Oldsmar was enabled by remote control systems
installed on employee computers at the city’s water treatment plant. In the 2015 attack on
the Ukraine power grid, the attack focused on compromising the industrial control systems
and was initiated by a “phishing” campaign that relied on social engineering to gain access.
These attacks are made possible by the networked infrastructure that is increasingly being
used to manage the power grid; it follows that the security of this networked infrastructure
is highly important.
Defense-in-depth is a critical strategy of building proper cybersecure systems. This approach
works to limit the impact of security failures by ensuring that multiple layers of security
features are in place to catch attacks. A system utilizing defense-in-depth does not rely on one
security component to block all attacks, but overlapping components that can redundantly
block attacks, mitigate attacks, or warn of potential breaches. Since many systems are
themselves layered, defense-in-depth advises proper defenses at each layer, as well as building
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defenses upon people, process, and technology [1] since individual elements can be defeated.

1.2

Scope

This undergraduate honors project is part of a defense-in-depth approach to designing a
designing a cybersecure power router (CSPR) for use in smart grid infrastructure. In addition
to the defenses built into the hardware itself, as well as that hardware’s control system, a
cybersecure management interface was necessary.
The task of this project was to build a webserver interface for interfacing with these CSPR
devices and then subject that webserver to cyberattacks and verify its defenses against them.
The different features of the webserver are discussed in section 2. These attacks make up
the bulk of the project’s effort, and are described in detail in section 3. SQL injection
attacks, cross-site-scripting attacks, supply chain attacks, and man-in-the-middle attacks
are all considered. Additionally, general security practices such as password requirements
that work to avoid weak passwords and multi-factor authentication support are built into
the webserver; these are discussed in section 4.

2

Features and Development

Developing the webserver was one of the tasks undertaken as part of this project, but the
primary task was still the security testing performed against the web application. The
purpose of the webserver is to act as a management interface for smart-grid electronics
communicating over the Modbus protocol. It can be used to monitor smart-grid devices
in real-time. The administrator of the web application sets up particular Modbus registers
(memory locations) to be monitored, and while the user is on that device’s page the values
in those Modbus registers will be read multiple times per minute. The server also includes a
form to allow users to manage the smart-grid devices by updating values in Modbus registers.
The webserver code can be found on the University of Arkansas GitLab instance, at the URL
6

provided in [6]. The security features mentioned here are discussed at more length in sections
3 and 4.

2.1

User Accounts

The webserver supports user account creation with two-factor authentication security. User
accounts are also subject to password requirements that disallow short passwords, passwords
that are too repetitive, and passwords that match a list of common passwords maintained
by Django. These follow the best practices outlined by the United States Cybersecurity &
Infrastructure Security Agency [5]. After creation, user accounts are required to add a second
factor. For development purposes this prints out access codes to the developer console, but
integration with SMS-sending services is supported by the plugin.

7

Figure 1: The login screen requires both a username and password. After entering the correct
password the user is required to enter a 2FA code.

2.2

Devices, Registers, and Values

“Modbus devices” are physical hardware that the server communicates with over a serial
connection via the Modbus RTU protocol. “Registers” are the memory locations that the
webserver users are allowed to modify. “Values” are the memory locations that the webserver
is allowed to query and display in its dynamic chart.
8

Users that are given administrative privileges can manage the Modbus devices, registers, and
values that are defined in the database using the Django-provided admin panel. From here,
administrators can create devices, add registers and values, or edit the memory locations
referenced by these registers and values. The variables for device creation primarily relate
to how the Modbus communication library should be configured to communicate with the
physical hardware; some examples are the baud rate for communication and the number
of stop bits to be expected. Registers and values have data for the memory address in
question, as well as whether the data should be understood as an integer or a fixed-point
decimal value, and, if so, how many decimal places it should have. All of this data is stored
in a SQL database.

Figure 2: When using Django’s code-first database modeling, the framework is able to
create an administration page that allows admin users to create and update database objects
without knowledge of SQL.
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2.3

Device View and Memory View

The server exposes a view for each device. When a user is routed to the view, the server
initiates Modbus communication with the device and begins to fetch data for the Values.
A form is generated which allows the user to input values for Registers and submit write
commands to the Modbus device. A list of the values defined for that device is exposed,
with buttons to add or remove them from the chart at the bottom of the page. The page
runs a loop that asynchronously queries the server for updated readings from the Modbus
device; when data is received it is stored in memory on the client’s machine. When the user
clicks a button to add a value to the chart, a time series of that value’s data for each reading
taken since the user arrived on the page is added to the chart, and the chart rescaled to fit
that data.

Figure 3: The “data view” page, which allows users to view data received from the physical
Modbus device. The chart in this image is empty since there was no physical device connected
to communicate with.
10

There is an alternate view, called the “memory view”. In this view the user can specify
a memory address and a number of registers to read from the Modbus device. The data
read in this way will be plotted on the chart at the bottom of the page. This was used in
demonstrative sessions such as the one pictured in figure 4, where a sine waveform generated
by emulation on the hardware was performed.

Figure 4: The “memory view” page, which allows users to view data received from the
physical Modbus device by viewing contiguous memory regions reported by the device. Here
a sine wave was produced in hardware emulation and its data placed into memory for viewing.

2.4
2.4.1

Frameworks and Libraries
Django [7]

Django is a framework for developing web applications in Python. It focuses on rapid
execution of app ideas and adheres to Python’s “batteries included” philosophy. Django
11

provided the webserver capabilities and routing systems, allowing my development work to
be limited to application logic, views, and communication with Modbus devices. Django
also provided a suite of secure-by-default subsystems that were critical to implementing this
server in a cyberattack-resistant manner. These secure defaults are discussed more in section
3.

2.4.2

SQL

A SQL server is used to store persistent data about configured devices. Interface to the server
is provided by Django’s object-relational model (ORM), which enables code-first definitions
of database constructs and allows for easy upgrades via migrations. Models are first defined
as Python classes, provided with database-specific attributes (data type, primary key, etc.),
then Django uses this information to build or update tables within the SQL database. New
rows, updates, or deletions are all passed through the ORM, enabling Django’s secure defaults
to protect the database from SQL injection attacks. While the server is database-agnostic
(requiring only that a Django plugin exists to support your database provider of choice), the
development version of the website used MariaDB as the database provider [8].

2.4.3

MinimalModbus [9]

MinimalModbus is a python library that facilitates communication with electronic devices
implementing the Modbus standard. The library manages the construction of modbus data
packets and the serial communication necessary to transmit requests and responses. Once
properly configured, se of this library enabled me to focus on the high-level logic of Modbus communication. Modbus registers are read from and written to synchronously, which
integrates well with Django’s default setup for synchronous communication.
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2.4.4

Django Two-Factor Authentication [10]

This library adds two-factor authentication support to the Django user accounts module.
Two-factor authentication is discussed in more detail in section 4. In this project a second
factor is required to log in once the user has enabled two-factor authentication, and each
view exposed by the server (excepting the login view and the view to set up the second
factor) require the user to have logged in with a two-factor protected account.
2.4.5

Chart.js [11]

Chart.js is a javascript module that enables the production of dynamic charts on webpages.
The library provides a configurable HTML5 canvas element that is used in this project to
generate a chart of data received from Modbus communications with a device. These updates
are performed in real time. The logic to upkeep the dataset was implemented as part of this
project, but chart.js handles all features related to display.

3

Attacks & Mitigations

3.1

Supply Chain Attack

Instead of directly targeting the application to be compromised, the attacker in a supply
chain attack compromises some part of that application’s dependencies. This definition is
broad, and attacks that are classified under it include
• A hacker compromises an application provided to internet users for download. The
compromised application downloads or executes malware upon its installation, but the
original creator of the application does not know this.
• A rogue employee compromises the software produced by their company to extract
sensitive information from one of that company’s clients. The compromised software
is a dependency of the real target and is not the target itself.
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• An attacker compromises an open-source library that is a dependency of several larger
projects.
With respect to the CSPR webserver, our concern is with the last of these. The project utilizes the Django framework as well as several open-source JavaScript modules; any of these
are potential points of weakness. Supply chain attacks of this variety are not theoretical —
they have actually occurred. Recently the developer of two open-source packages, colors.js
and faker.js, sabotaged these projects by pushing breaking changes to the repositories used
to serve them to thousands of dependents. Many projects that had these libraries as transitive dependencies, often several layers deep, found themselves victim to this self-sabotage
[12]. Another instance is the well-known SolarWinds attack, in which hackers breached the
network of IT firm SolarWinds and caused the updates issued by SolarWinds to include
compromised code. The perpetrators are believed to have used this to focus on a small
number of high value targets, even though many were compromised [13].
Finally, in July of 2021, Cloudflare described a vulnerability found within their cdnjs product
which they had patched and believed to not be executed. cdnjs ”provides JavaScript, CSS,
images, and font assets for websites” with the benefits that 1) visitors to the website need
not re-download script files if another website they visited has already referenced them, and
2) server owners do not need to host the files themselves [14]. The vulnerability allowed
remote code execution and the ability to modify assets, potentially forcing cdnjs to serve
compromised JavaScript files. Cloudflare believes that this vulnerability was not exploited
before it was patched, but it’s possible that future vulnerabilities of similar scope will be
found in any web-based package provider. However, the first redeveloped version of the
CSPR webserver utilized cdnjs to deliver JavaScript libraries for data visualization, namely
the chart.js, moment.js, and chartjs-adapter-moment packages. When the user landed on the
device management page these scripts would be downloaded from cdnjs and, if compromised,
run compromised code in the user’s browser session. Note that while this vulnerability exists,
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it’s not possible to demonstrate an exploit on the webserver due to the requirement to take
control of a package provider like cdnjs, which is illegal. Nevertheless, this vulnerability
required an immediate fix.
Because the number of scripts used was small and the size of the files themselves were small
enough to avoid causing hosting problems, the webserver pages were redesigned to serve a
copy of stable versions of these scripts. The dependency on cdnjs was completely removed and
the reliance on an auto-updating set of dependencies was severed, mitigating the vulnerability
to supply chain attacks on the CSPR webserver. The updates required configuring the
Apache service hosting the webserver to also serve static files from a static directory. The
files are included in the code repository and managed by the Django framework.

3.2

SQL Injection

SQL injection is a class of attacks that exploit poor input-sanitization procedures to interact
with a data store in unintended ways. A SQL injection exploit may allow an attacker to
read data from the database arbitrarily, update entries in the database (possibly giving
a user controlled by the attacker more access than they are otherwise authorized), delete
data in the database, or change the schema of stored data in service of future exploits [15].
Since these attacks can serve to escalate privileges they are a high-value exploit sought after
by malicious actors. Clarke notes that while web applications are not uniquely vulnerable
and any application that receives untrusted user input has a chance of compromise, web
applications are targeted most frequently due to their oftentimes database-driven nature.
The inputs that the user enters will cause interactions with the database, so there are ripe
opportunities for exploit [15].
Galluccio et. al [16] describe how these vulnerabilities arise: Imagine a web form in which
a user enters a string to search for other users registered with the application (perhaps for
the purposes of sharing a document). The web application searches for usernames matching
15

that substring in the database and returns a list of all partial matches, which is then placed
into a dropdown list on screen to allow the user to make their selections. Under intended
operation, the webserver runs a query, shown below, that is based on the user’s input.
SELECT username
FROM u s e r s
WHERE username LIKE ’<input>%’
The webserver replaces the <input> text with the entry entered by the user. However, if the
server uses simple text-replacement to construct the query, it is vulnerable to a maliciouslyengineered query. Suppose that an attacker wishes to retrieve user emails for a spamming
operation. They input ’ UNION SELECT email FROM users; --. The server will perform
text-replacement and execute the following query:
SELECT username
FROM u s e r s
WHERE username LIKE ’ ’ UNION SELECT e m a i l FROM u s e r s ; −−%’
This is most clearly reformatted as
SELECT username
FROM u s e r s
WHERE username LIKE ’ ’

UNION

SELECT e m a i l
FROM u s e r s ;
−−%’
With this formatting it is clear that two queries are being executed. The first query is
16

“intended” by the web application programmer and is simply searching for users with no
username. This query’s results are unioned with another query that reads user emails from
the database. This malicious query thus returns all available user emails, and the method
could be extended to determine which users are administrators, or to extract passwords or
password hashes for later cracking.
Instead of searching for data, an attacker can also destroy information. With the input
’; DROP TABLE users; -- the attacker can cause the entire users table to be destroyed,
necessitating restoration from backup. Alternatively the attacker could engineer the takeover
of an existing user account by changing the email associated or deleting that user and
recreating it.
Galluccio et. al. demonstrate several methods of defense against SQL injection. These
defenses are often mixed and matched as part of a defense-in-depth strategy. Input validation
is performed by inspecting the user input before a query is constructed. This process can
involve denying input that contains any “special” characters that are necessary for a SQL
injection attack, such as ’ or -, or only accepting input if it matches a certain pattern (and
that particular pattern only contains safe characters). Parameterized queries are another
approach. Instead of constructing strings dynamically as shown in the previous examples,
placeholder variables are used while building the SQL statement. Data is then bound to
those variables, which properly escapes the input data and constructs a safe string. If the
example above had used parameterized queries, the database would have correctly searched
for a user named ’; DROP TABLE users; -- instead.
According to the Django documentation, parameterized queries are used when interfacing
with a SQL database from the Django framework and its Object-Relational Mapping [17].
The documentation explains that ”since parameters may be user-provided and therefore
unsafe, they are escaped by the underlying database driver.” Because the updated CSPR
webserver performs all database access using Django models, the inputs are safely escaped
17

and the system is not vulnerable to SQL injection.

3.2.1

Sample attacks

This section describes attacks run on the webserver that are SQL injection attempts. In
each attack an attached debugger was used to stop the program and inspect memory.
1. This attack was performed on the login form, with the goal to delete the users table
from the database. The text ’; DROP TABLE auth user; -- was input to the login
form in the username field and a garbage password was entered.
Result: The users table was not deleted. This was verified by inspecting the database
and confirming that no data deletion occurred.
The steps to reproduce the attack are
(a) With the project open, set a debugger in the file django/contrib/auth/ init .py
at the top of the authenticate(request, **credentials) function. In my
project, set up following the install instructions included with the code, this file
lives in the django subfolder of ~
/venvs/cspr env/lib/python3.7/site-packages.
(b) Run the project with debugger attached.
(c) Navigate to http://localhost:8000. Logout of the CSPR website, if logged in.
(d) Login to the MySQL instance. I run the following commands to login and verify
that the table exists before the attack:
> sudo mysql -u cspr -p
> use cspr\_db;
> select * from auth\_user
(e) On the CSPR website, enter any text you like into the password field, and enter
18

the text ’; DROP TABLE auth user; -- into the username field (see figure 5).
Submit the form.

Figure 5: Entering the SQL Injection payload.

(f) Your debugger should pause at the authenticate function where the breakpoint
was set (see figure 6). From here it can be verified that the malicious input was
received by the server and will be used to look up a user. Resume the program.

Figure 6: The debugger paused at the point of receiving the POST request from the client.
Note that the username field shown at the bottom of the screen matches the form, indicating
that the server has received the input as written and mitigation of the attack must be serverside.
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(g) Verify after resuming the program that the login fails and the auth user table still
exists (see figure 7. The attack has failed.

Figure 7: Verifying that the auth user table still exists

2. This attack was performed on the login form, with the goal to gain access to another user without possessing that users password. A testing user was created named
sqltest2. The text sqltest2 was entered into the username field and the text ’ AND
1=1; -- was entered into the password field.
Result: No users were returned by the query, which was verified by inspecting the
immediate query results with an attached debugger.
To reproduce this attack after creating the sqltest2 user:
(a) Follow steps 1a, 1b, and 1c.
(b) On the CSPR website, enter the username sqltest2 and the password ’ AND
1=1; --.
(c) Submit the form and verify with a debugger (similar to step 1f) that the input is
received as written. Note that the login fails, and thus the attack has failed.
3. This attack was also performed on the login form, with the goal of updating an existing user to have administrative permissions. Using the same testing user as before,
sqltest2, we attempt to login with a query that has the side effect of updating that
user’s admin flag to true. While logging in a query is appended that searches for the
user and sets the is staff to 1:
sqltest2’; UPDATE auth_user SET is_staff = 1 WHERE username = ’sqltest2’; -20

Any text is allowed for the password.
To reproduce this attack:
(a) Follow steps 1a, 1b, and 1c.
(b) On the CSPR website, enter the username above and any password.
(c) Submit the form and verify with a debugger (similar to step 1f) that the input
is received as written. Continue execution and then inspect the database table.
Note that the user’s is staff flag is still 0, indicating that the attack has failed.
This failure can also be verified by logging in as the user and noting the lack of
any links to the admin page.

3.3

Cross-Site Scripting

Cross-site scripting (abbreviated XSS) exploits unsanitized user input to change the structure
of a web page or execute arbitrary code in the client browser [18]. The attack occurs when
the site displays compromised text from a user. Because the user’s input is part of the
HTML content of the page, carefully crafted input can be rendered by the browser as if it
was HTML text.
In a simple example, imagine a user profile page that includes a freeform text field for the
user to write a description of themselves. The contents of that field are rendered inside a
<p> tag for visitors to the profile page. If the user enters the text
H e l l o , <b>world !</b>

into the text field, the server will render the entered content inside of the <p> tags and the
<b> tags will cause the content to be written in bold. This is due to the fact that the browser
interprets the text as part of the HTML page.
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More malicious variants of this attack exist. The Django security documentation describes
how attackers can run scripts in the client’s browser by storing the malicious script in
database fields and then retrieving them for other users [17]. In the CSPR webserver defense
against these attacks is provided both by the Django framework and by the schema of the
database and models. Django escapes specific characters that must be used to perform an
XSS attack, which works by converting characters according to the following scheme [19]:
• < and > are converted to &lt; and &gt;
• ’ and " are converted to &#x27; and &quot;
• & is converted to &amp;
These changes protect from most attacks, but are still dependent on myself, the programmer,
to avoid using the templating language in places where attackers can inject code without
those characters. In some forms Django will also restrict character entry to certain allowed
characters, like when creating users.
Another defense strategy is based on the database schema and model definitions. When
entering values for registers on the device management page the server expects all inputs
to be numbers. This requirement is enforced both on the front end and on the back end.
The webpage shown to the user requires input to be numeric, but this can be defeated with
client-side debugging tools. Therefore, the server also verifies that received data is numeric
for these fields and returns an exception if the field is not numeric. Finally, the database’s
data types for certain fields also assist in enforcing data validity.
3.3.1

Sample attacks

1. I verified that the signup form does not allow users with the username testuser<b>xss</b>
to be created. Django verifies the text on the server-side and refuses to create the user
because it contains < and > in its username. To reproduce this attack, follow these
22

steps:
(a) Run the project and navigate to the home page. If you are logged in, log out.
(b) Click on the signup button to go to the signup page.
(c) Enter the text testuser<b>xss</b> for the username field, and any password.
(d) Submit the form and notice that Django rejects the submission for having illegal
characters in its username.
2. In this attack I edited an existing device’s name in the database to demonstrate that
Django properly escapes characters. A device had its name changed to <i>Device</i>
by manipulating the database. Note that this change of data would require an attacker
to first infiltrate the database, but it is useful as a demonstration of Django’s anti-XSS
features. To reproduce this attack:
(a) Create a device using an admin user.
(b) Access the MySQL database with your admin user. On my testing machine, the
command for this is > sudo mariadb -u <username> -p
(c) Use the database for the Webserver. > use cspr db
(d) Run the following SQL command to change device names to ¡i¿Device¡/i¿. Note
that this will update the name of every device, but this is sufficient for testing
purposes.
> update devices set name = ’<i>Device</i>’;
(e) Run the webserver, login, and navigate to a device page. The name of the device
appears as written above, and not in italics, indicating that Django has detected
this attempt at cross-site scripting and properly escaped the characters to foil it.
23

Figure 8: The XSS attack has failed, as the tag text is still visible and has not been parsed
as HTML.

For another example, use the text <script>alert(’XSS’)</script>Device instead,
which will produce a pop-up dialog in the browser if it is successful. By extension, we
can see how XSS attacks can enable the embedding of malicious scripts for the purpose
of hijacking a client session, harvesting data, or escalating to another exploit.

4
4.1

General Security
Multi-Factor Authentication

In the most basic sense a multi-factor authentication (MFA) scheme requires the user attempting to access resources to present multiple proofs of identity; a real-life example might
be the multitude of documents needed to obtain a passport. Each additional independent
credential increases the difficulty of an account takeover. The Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency states [20]:
A typical MFA login would require the user to present some combination of the following:
• Something you know: like a password or Personal Identification Number (PIN);
• Something you have: like a smart card, mobile token, or hardware token; and,
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• Some form of biometric factor (e.g., fingerprint, palm print, or voice recognition).

Multi-factor authentication was added to the CSPR webserver by using the plugin djangotwo-factor-auth [10]. During the signup process the user is able to create an account without
providing a second factor, but when attempting to access any page the user must be authenticated with a second factor just as they must be logged in. If the user is not authenticated
they are redirected to the plugin’s provided page to enable a second factor. For development
purposes, the plugin is currently configured to print the 2FA code to the developer console;
configuration options exist to send the second-factor codes over SMS.

4.2

Man-in-the-Middle

HTTP is vulnerable to man-in-the-middle (MITM) attacks, where an attacker impersonates
the server and/or client while the real server and client transact information. Sitting in the
middle of the two, the attacker has full access into the requests and responses and is free to
edit data, save responses for later, or extract secret information. These attacks can result in
total compromise of sensitive information, or enable the attacker to bypass security protocols
by impersonating an authorized user
Transport Layer Security (TLS) is used to prevent this kind of attack; it is one of a kind of
key exchange protocols that require the communicating to authenticate and is the dominant
such protocol for the purpose of securing web traffic. Boyd et. al. outline how TLS differs
from Secure Shell (SSH) and Internet Protocol Security (IPSec), but most critical to know
is that web traffic secured using TLS is called HTTPS. There have been two versions of SSL
and four versions of TLS, with most browsers and sites currently operating on TLS 1.2 and
migrating to TLS 1.3 [21].
In an HTTPS context, the communication parties establish a TLS connection before sending
HTTP data across the connection. In the handshake procedure the parties exchange cry-
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tographic keys and thereafter can communicate with encrypted data. This prevents MITM
attacks not by preventing an actor from intercepting the messages, but by preventing them
from decoding any intercepted messages. TLS also has the property that the keys have
forward secrecy, meaning that if, in the future, the key used by the server is compromised
the old session data still cannot be recovered and an attacker must still own the client’s key
to decrypt the communicated data [21].
For this project, demonstrative HTTPS support was added to the webserver by configuring
an instance of the Apache webserver to use a locally-generated certificate. In a production
environment this would be switched for a certificate obtained from a certifying authority,
such as Let’s Encrypt (a service provided by the Internet Security Research Authority [22]).

5

Conclusion

Network-connected electric grid hardware promises to make the electric grid better-monitored
and more efficient, and designing smart grid systems in a secure manner is vital to their
continued operation. Since the electric grid is critical infrastructure, a defense-in-depth approach is necessary to secure the network-connected components of the smart grid. Thus,
any interface to components of the grid system must also have defensive measures. The
demonstrated attacks against the CSPR webserver serve to test its ability to defend against
common intrusion attempts, and the general security work conforms to the defense-in-depth
approach by making each attempted attack more costly.
The CSPR webserver utilizes the Django framework’s approach to secure user input against
SQL Injection and XSS attacks, and serves its own static files to greatly increase the difficulty of supply chain attacks.. With a security certificate and an HTTPS-enabled host,
the web server can be assured that man-in-the-middle attacks are guarded against, and
two-factor authentication provides additional layers of authentication to ensure that multi-
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ple parts of a user’s identity must be compromised to hijack their account. These changes
provide a strong foundation for cybersecurity and leave room for enhancements to follow.
Possible enhancements include intrusion detection based on network activity analysis, or a
dependency-verification system that monitors for vulnerabilities in the dependencies of the
web application and notifies developers of potential vulnerabilities in their supply chain.
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